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PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE, Richard Rorty; Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979, 401 pages, $20. 
Richard Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature brings to light the 
deep sense of crisis within the profession of academic philosophy which is similar 
to the paralyzing pluralism in contemporary theology and the inveterate indeter-
minacy of literary criticism. Richard Rorty's provocative and profound medita-
tions impel philosophers to examine the problematic status of their discipline— 
only to discover that modern European philosophy has come to an end. 
Rorty strikes a deathblow to modern European philosophy by telling a 
story about the emergence, development and decline of its primary props: the 
correspondence theory of truth, the notion of privileged representations and the 
idea of a self-reflective transcendental subject. Rorty's fascinating tale—his-story 
—is regulated by three fundamental shifts which he delineates in detail and pro-
motes in principle: the move toward anti-realism or conventionalism in ontology, 
the move toward the demythologizing of the Myth of the Given or anti-founda-
tionalism in epistemology, and the move toward detranscendentalizing the sub-
ject or dismissing the mind as a sphere of inquiry. 
The chief importance of Rorty's book is that it brings together in an origi-
nal and intelligible narrative the major insights of the patriarchs of postmodern 
American philosophy—W. V. Quine, Wilfred Sellars, and Nelson Goodman— 
and persuasively presents the radical consequences of their views for contempo-
rary philosophy. Rorty credits Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey for having 
"brought us into a period of 'revolutionary' philosophy" by undermining the pre-
vailing Cartesian and Kantian paradigms and advancing new conceptions of 
philosophy. And these monumental figures surely inspire Rorty. Yet, Rorty's 
philosophical debts—the actual sources of his particular anti-Cartesian and anti-
Kantian arguments—are Quine's holism, Sellars' anti-foundationalism, and 
Goodman's pluralism. In short, despite his adamant attack on analytical philoso-
phy—the last stage of modern European philosophy—Rorty feels most comfort-
able with the analytical form of philosophical argumentation (shunned by Witt-
genstein and Heidegger). 
From the disparate figures of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Dewey, Rorty 
gets a historicist directive: to eschew the quest for certainty and the search for 
foundations. 
These writers have kept alive the suggestion that, even when we 
have justified true belief about everything we want to know, we 
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may have no more than conformity to the norms of the day. They 
have kept alive the historicist sense that this century's "superstition" 
was the last century's triumph of reason, as well as the relativist 
sense that the latest vocabulary, borrowed from the latest scientific 
achievement, may not express privileged representations of essences, 
but be just another of the potential infinity of vocabularies in which 
the world can be described, (p. 367) 
For Rorty, the Western philosophical tradition can be overcome principally by 
holding at arm's length the ahistorical philosophical notions of necessity, univer-
sality, rationality, objectivity and transcendentality. Instead, we should speak 
historically about transient practices, contingent descriptions and révisable 
theories. 
The basic lesson Rorty learns from Quine, Sellars, and Goodman is an 
anti-reductionist one: to refuse to privilege one language, language-game, morali-
ty, or society over another solely by appealing to philosophical criteria. For the 
results will more than likely be apologetics, "attempts to eternalize a certain con-
temporary language-game, social practice, or self-image" (p. 10). In cases of con-
flict and disagreement, we should either support our prevailing practices, reform 
them or put forward realizable alternatives to them—without appealing to ahis-
torical philosophical criteria or standards. In short, Rorty rejects philosophical 
discourse as the privileged mode of resolving intellectual disagreements. 
Rorty's historicist, anti-reductionist viewpoint rests upon the three funda-
mental shifts in postmodern American philosophy toward anti-realism in ontol-
ogy, anti-foundationalism in epistemology and detranscendentalism in philosophy 
of mind. The first move can be traced directly to Quine's and Goodman's con-
vincing criticisms of Rudolph Carnap's grand reductionist project in Logical Con-
struction of the World (1928) and of A. J. Ayer's more simplistic yet equally 
influential verificationist program in Language, Truth and Logic (1936). Quine's 
holism in his famous essay "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" and Goodman's critical 
pluralism in his succinct masterpiece "The Way the World Is"—both deeply anti-
realist in spirit—contain two major insights: the conventional character of con-
structing logical systems of the world and the theory-laden character of observa-
tions. These insights have been recently popularized by Thomas Kuhn's historicist 
and anti-reductionist philosophy of science. 
The move toward anti-realism and conventionalism in ontology leaves no 
room for a correspondence theory of truth (of any importance) in that it under-
mines the very distinctions upon which such a theory rests: the distinctions be-
tween ideas and objects, words and things, language and the world, propositions 
and states of affairs, theories and facts. The result is not a form of idealism be-
cause the claim is not that ideas create objects, words create things, language 
creates the world and so forth. Nor is the result a form of Kantianism because the 
claim is not that ideas constitute objects, words constitute things, language consti-
tutes the world and so on. Rather the result is a form of pragmatism because the 
claim is that evolving descriptions and ever-changing versions of objects, things 
and the world issue forth from various communities as responses to certain prob-
lematics, as attempts to overcome specific situations and as means to satisfy par-
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ticular needs and interests. To put it crudely, ideas, words and language are not 
mirrors which copy the world but rather tools with which we cope with the 
world. 
In a more philosophical vein—and as more pointedly argued in Rorty's 
celebrated essay "The World Well Lost"—the theory-laden character of observa-
tions relativizes talk about the world such that realist appeals to "the world" as a 
final court of appeal to determine what is true can only be viciously circular. We 
cannot isolate "the world" from theories of the world, then compare these theories 
of the world with a theory-free world. We cannot compare theories with anything 
that is not a product of another theory. So any talk about "the world" is relative to 
the theories available. 
The second move, toward demythologizing the Myth of the Given or anti-
foundationalism in epistemology, can be traced to Sellars' persuasive effort in his 
renowned essay "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" to call into question 
the given element in experience—the self-authenticating, intrinsically credible, 
theory-neutral, noninferential element—which provides the foundations for other 
knowledge-claims and serves as the terminating point for chains of epistemic justi-
fications in traditional theories of knowledge. This move takes the form of an 
attack on pre-linguistic awareness and various notions of intuition. This anti-
foundationalist viewpoint precludes the notion of privileged representations be-
cause it views knowledge as a relation to propositions rather than as privileged 
relations to the objects certain propositions are about. 
If we think in the first way, we will see no need to end the poten-
tially infinite regress of propositions-brought-forward-in-defense-
of-other-propositions. . . . If we think of knowledge in the second 
way, we will want to get behind reason to causes, beyond argu-
ment to compulsion from the object known, to a situation in which 
argument would be not just silly but impossible, for anyone gripped 
by the object in the required way will be unable to doubt or to see 
an alternative. To reach that point is to reach the foundations of 
knowledge, (p. 159) 
For Rorty, the search for such foundations expresses a need to be gripped, 
grasped and compelled. This holds for Plato's Eye of the Soul perceiving the 
World of Being, Descartes' Eye of the Mind turned inward grasping clear and dis-
tinct mental representations or Locke's Eye of the Mind turned outward seeing 
"singular presentations to sense" as bases for our knowledge. All such models view 
ahistorical, terminal confrontation—rather than historical, fluid conversation— 
as the determinant of human belief. In short, the Myth of the Given—the philo-
sophical privileging of representations—principally rests upon epistemological 
attempts to escape from history and put a closure upon human practices. There-
fore Rorty concludes, 
When Sellars's and Quine's doctrines are purified, they appear as 
complementary expressions of a single claim: that no "account of 
the nature of knowlege" can rely on a theory of representations 
which stand in privileged relations to reality. The work of these two 
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philosophers enables us . . . to make clear why an "account of the 
nature of knowledge" can be, at most, a description of human 
behavior, (p. 182) 
The third move, toward detranscendentalizing the subject or dismissing 
the mind as a sphere of inquiry, can be traced to Gilbert Ryle's logical behavior-
ism in The Concept of Mind (1949) and Quine's radical behaviorism in Word and 
Object (1960). Rorty's own epistemological behaviorism links Ryle's attack on the 
Cartesian disembodied ego and Quine's assault on the Kantian transcendental 
subject (and Husserlian nonempirical ego) to subversive strategies against episte-
mology per se. 
A holistic approach to knowledge is not a matter of anti-founda-
tionalist polemic, but a distrust of the whole epistemological enter-
prise. A behavioristic approach to episodes of "direct awareness" is 
not a matter of antimentalistic polemic, but a distrust of the Platon-
ic quest for that special sort of certainty associated with visual per-
ception. The image of the Mirror of Nature.. .suggests, and is sug-
gested by, the image of philosophy as such a quest, (p. 181) 
Two crucial consequences flow from Rorty's historicist, anti-reductionist 
project. First, the distinction between the "soft" human sciences and the "hard" 
natural sciences collapses. The basic difference between the Geisteswissenschaften 
and the Naturwissenschaften is neither the self-defining character of the former 
nor the context-free facts of the latter. Rather the difference is between the rela-
tive stability of normal vocabularies in the natural sciences and the relative in-
stability of normal vocabularies in the human sciences. And the irreducibility of 
one vocabulary to another does not imply an ontological distinction—only a 
functional difference. 
As Kuhn says in connection with a smaller, though obviously re-
lated issue, we cannot differentiate scientific communities by "sub-
ject matter," but rather by "examining patterns of education and 
communication." (p. 331) 
This rudimentary demythologizing of the natural sciences is of immense impor-
tance for literary critics, artists, and theologians who have been in retreat and on 
the defensive since the Enlightenment. And the sparks generated by such a novel 
viewpoint in our technocentric culture are only beginning to fly. 
Second, the conception of philosophy is no longer that of a tribunal of pure 
reason which defends or debunks claims to knowledge made by science, morality, 
art, or religion. Rather the voice of the philosopher is but one voice—that of the 
informed dilettante or polypragmatic, Socratic thinker—among others in a grand 
Conversation. Rorty's deconstruction of philosophy as a subject, a Fach, a field of 
professional inquiry results in equalizing (or de-privileging) the voice of the 
philosopher in this grand Conversation. 
In this conception, "philosophy" is not a name for a discipline which 
confronts permanent issues, and unfortunately keeps misstating 
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them, or attacking them with clumsy dialectical instruments. Rath-
er, it is a cultural genre, a "voice in the conversation of mankind" 
(to use Michael Oakeshott's phrase), which centers on one topic 
rather than another at some given time not by dialectical necessity 
but as a result of various things happening elsewhere in the conver-
sation (the New Science, the French Revolution, the modern novel) 
or of individual men of genius who think of something new (Hegel, 
Marx, Frege, Freud, Wittgenstein, Heidegger), or perhaps of the 
resultant of several such forces, (p. 264) 
Rorty's historicist, anti-reductionist perspective amounts to a self-styled 
neo-pragmatism. His plausible yet objectionable uses of Wittgenstein, Heidegger, 
and Dewey and his creative misreadings of Quine, Sellars, and Goodman yield 
the most adversarial position in American academic philosophy since the fervent 
anti-professionalism of William James. Rorty's anti-epistemological radicalism 
and belletristic anti-academicism are welcome in a discipline deeply entrenched in 
a debased insularity and debilitating isolation. Yet, ironically, Rorty's project, 
though pregnant with rich possibilities, remains polemical and hence barren. It 
refuses to give birth to the offspring it conceives. Rorty leads philosophy to the 
complex world of politics and culture, but does not permit it to get its hands dirty. 
Rorty's seductive interpretation of the Western philosophical tradition in 
general and the Anglo-American analytical tradition in particular is itself sympto-
matic of the ahistorical character of Anglo-American philosophy. Rorty's histori-
cist sense remains too broad, too thin—devoid of the realities of power; his neo-
pragmatism is too vague, too nonchalant—and unmindful of the decline of lib-
eralism. For example, Rorty's Wittgenstein had nothing to say about the later 
Wittgenstein's bleak views on the decay of Western civilization (recently pub-
lished under the title Culture and Value); his Heidegger is silent about the early 
Heidegger's anti-democratic panacea for Europe; and his Dewey lacks the activist 
Dewey's sense of the need for a new vision of society and culture. Rorty's decon-
struction of philosophy seems to retreat into the philosophical arena as soon as 
pertinent socio-historical issues—such as the relation of objectivity-claims to op-
pressive actions or transcendental discourse to ideological hegemony—are raised. 
Rorty's narrative leaves unexplored many socio-historical questions of 
utmost importance. In fact, his historicist sense seems to overlook them. For 
instance, is there a link between the emerging anti-realism and conventionalism 
in ontology and the crisis of intellectual authority within our learned professional 
academies and educational institutions? Is there a relation between the anti-
foundationalism in epistemology and the crisis of legitimacy among those subject-
ed to our intellectual authority? Does the detranscendentalizing of the subject 
express the deep sense of impotence in postmodern capitalist societies, the sense of 
reaching a dead-end with no foreseeable way out or no discernible liberating 
projects in the near future—hence the proliferation of prevailing apocalyptic fore-
casts, narcissistic living and self-indulgent, ironic forms of thinking? If science is, 
as Rorty notes, a "value-laden enterprise," is there an ideological character intrin-
sic to the very methods of the natural sciences owing to an agreed-upon concep-
tion of and disposition toward nature which may promote the domination not 
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only of our environment but also those subsumed under the rubric "nature" such 
as women, non-Europeans and even "earthy" workers? 
The central concern underlying these rhetorical yet crucial questions is 
that it is impossible to historicize philosophy without partly politicizing (in con-
trast to vulgarly ideologizing) it. Surely, the relation of philosophy to history and 
politics is complex. Yet embarking on a historicist project which deconstructs 
philosophy entails dragging in the complexities of politics and culture. To tell a 
tale about the historical character of philosophy while eschewing the political 
content, role and function of philosophy in various historical periods is to promote 
an ahistorical approach in the name of history. To deconstruct the privileged 
notions of objectivity, universality and transcendentality without acknowledging 
and accenting the oppressive deeds done under the aegis of these notions is to 
write a thin (i.e., intellectual and homogeneous) history; that is, a history which 
fervently attacks epistemological privilege but remains relatively silent about 
political, economic, racial and sexual privilege. Such a history even raises the 
sinister possibility that the anti-epistemological radicalism of neo-pragmatism— 
much like the anti-metaphysical radicalism of poststructuralism—may be an 
emerging form of ideological hegemony in late capitalist societies which endorses 
the existing order while undergirding sophisticated anti-epistemological and anti-
metaphysical tastes of postmodern avant-gardists. 
Indeed, the relativist, even nihilist, outlook of neo-pragmatism upsets 
mainstream realists and old-style humanists. So the battle within the Academy 
between the professional avant-gardists and professional establishmentarians will 
continue to be intense. Yet after the philosophical smoke clears, the crucial task is 
to pursue thick (i.e., social and heterogeneous) historical accounts for the emer-
gence, development, sustenance and decline of particular vocabularies in the 
natural and human sciences against the backdrop of dynamic changes in specific 
(and often coexisting) modes of production, political conflicts, cultural configura-
tions and personal turmoil. 
Surprisingly, Rorty is highly suspicious of thick historical accounts. For 
example, when a provisional explanation—even a speculative one—seems appro-
priate for the centrality of ocular metaphors in Western thought, he asserts that 
there was, we moderns may say with the ingratitude of hindsight, 
no particular reason why this ocular metaphor seized the imagina-
tion of the founders of Western thought, (p. 38) 
And when he contemplates questions about the acceptance and performance of 
modern science and moral consciousness in the West, he concludes that "in no 
case does anyone know what might count as a good answer" (p. 341). 
In light of such pessimism regarding historical accounts, one wonders 
whether Rorty takes his own pragmatic viewpoint seriously. Is a "good answer" 
something more than a particular insightful interpretation based on an emerging, 
prevailing or declining social consensus put to a specific purpose? Is not Rorty's 
narrative itself a "good answer" to Cartesians, Kantians and analytic philoso-
phers? In short, Rorty's neo-pragmatism has no place for ahistorical philosophical 
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justifications—yet his thin historicism rests content with intellectual historical 
narratives and distrusts social historical narratives. Furthermore, Rorty's refusal 
to take seriously politics and culture is clearly illustrated in his frequent use of a 
homogeneous conception of society. 
Explaining rationality and epistemic authority by reference to what 
society lets us say, rather than the latter by the former, is the essence 
of what I shall call "epistemological behaviorism." (p. 174) 
It should be clear that Rorty's thin historicism needs Marx, Durkheim, Weber and 
Simmel; that is, his narrative needs a more subtle historical and sociological per-
spective. 
Like his maternal grandfather Walter Rauschenbusch, the great social 
gospel advocate, Richard Rorty has secured an undeniable place in American 
letters. Both defied the systematic aims of their disciplines and directed their ener-
gies to the impure realities of history. Both confronted a rigid, lethargic Academy 
and changed a host of would-be academicians into critical actors. But Rorty has 
gone further. He has written with more profundity, argued with more brilliance 
and sketched his perspective on a larger canvas, namely, Western culture itself. 
Yet, in the end, Rauschenbusch and Rorty shed light upon varying aspects of the 
same, though evolving, historical problematic: the crisis of American capitalist 
civilization. And, despite their blindnesses, we are better equipped to overcome 
this crisis because of Rauschenbusch and Rorty—because of the engaged patriarch 
of theological liberalism and his insouciant progeny of post-philosophical lib-
eralism. 
NOTE: It should be noted that Rorty learned anti-reductionist lessons from his early teachers at the 
University of Chicago, Richard McKeon and Robert Brumbaugh, and his thesis adviser at Yale, Patii 
Weiss. His first two major essays, published in 1961, bear witness to such lessons: "The Limits of 
Reductionism" in Experience, Existence and The Good: Essays in Honor of Paul Weiss (Carbondale, 
1961), ed. Irwin C. Lied, pp. 100-116, and "Pragmatism, Categories, and Language" in Philosophi-
cal Review 70 (1961), 197-223. 
For Rorty's more detailed and technical attacks on the various forms of intuition, see his im-
portant essay, "Intuition" in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 4, pp. 204-12; "Wittgenstein, 
Privileged Access, and Incommunicability," American Philosophical Quarterly 7 (1970), 192-205; 
and "Criteria and Necessity," Nous 7 (1973), 313-29. 
Rorty's most explicit treatment of the professional character of contemporary American 
philosophy can be found in his brilliant essay, "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist 
Culture," The Georgia Review 30 (1976), 757-69. 
Rorty's critical advice to Michel Foucault applies equally to himself when he writes, "His 
obviously sincere attempt to make philosophical thinking be of some use, do some good, help people, 
is not going to get anywhere until he condescends to do a bit of dreaming about the future, rather 
than stopping dead after genealogising the present." "Beyond Nietzsche and Marx," London Review 
of Books, 19 February-4 March, 1981, p. 6. Richard Bernstein makes this charge more pointedly in 
his fine review of Rorty's book in The Review of Metaphysics 33 (1980), 745-75, especially 767-75. 
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